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than an auctioneer. They have duties to perform for all con.
cerned, and in the performance of those duties they may adjourn
the sale for good cause shown. Repeated decisions have established that rule, and in the leading case of Collier v. FhiYdpe, 13
Wend. 229, the court went further, and held that such an officer
-was bound to exercise a reasonable discretion in that matter. The
same rule had been previously sanctioned in numerous cases, and
was expressly laid down by the chancellor in the case of Kelley
v. Israel, 11 Paige Oh. Rep. 154, which is one of the latest cases
upon the subject: Tinkham v. Purdy, 5 Johns. 345; McDonald
v. Neilson, 2 Id. 190; Keightly v. Birch, 3 Campb. 321; Leader
v. Denney, 1 Bos. & Pul. 359.
But the regord shows in this case that the bid of the appellant
was never accepted, and that the adjournments were made by the
direction of the solicitors of the complainants to enable the
respondents to pay the mortgage-debt and save the mortgaged
property from sacrifice. Negotiations to that effect were opened
between the parties to the suit on the day the first bid of the
appellant was made, and they were completed within two days, so
that all concerned knew or might have known that a sale had
become unnecessary. A subsequent postponement took place tZ
enable the respondents to carry the arrangements into effect.
They paid the debt, and the complainants executed a discharge
for the same. Justice has been done, and all are satisfied except
the appellant, and he has no just ground of complaint.
Decree affirmed with costs.
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LANPHIER v. BUCK.
A testator, having given to his nieces a life interest in his residuary estate,
directed that, " in case all their children should die either in their lifetimes, or
after their decease, under age, and without lawful issue," then his trustees should
"pay, assign, and transfer" the shares of such nieces equally amongst all his
nephews and nieces who should be living at such time or times, and "to the issue
of such of them as may be then dead (such issue to be entitled to its parent's share
only)." He further directed, that such benefit of survivorship should not, as to a
part of the funds given, operate in the case of one of the nieces, but that her sbare
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should be paid in the same manner as he had directed with respect to a legacy to
his niece E. G., "in case of her decease without issue, or their all dying under
age, and without issue." The direction with respect to the legacy to E. G. was
expressed in the same terms as those used in the gift to the nieces generally,
without express mention of death without issue. M. B., one of the nieces, died
unmarried, with respect to her share: Held,
1st. That there was- sufficient indication of intention that the gift over should
take effect.
2dly. That "issue" meant children.
3dly. That the gift to issue of deceased nephews and nieces was original, not
substitutionary.
4thly. That, whether original or substitutionary, such issue need not survive the
tenant for life in order to entitle them to take.
5thly. Nor need they have survived their parents, the gift being original; secus,
if it had been substitutionary.
6thly. The gift to the issue was in joint tenancy.
PETITION.-This was an application for payment out of court,
and distribution, of a sum of 26271. Consols, the rights of the
several claimants depending on the construction of the will of the
Rev. Thomas Bond. By this will, dated the 7th March 1810, the
testator gave his real estate to trustees, upon trusts for conversion ;
and after giving his wife a life estate in the residue, and dealing
with a portion of the residue after her death, as to the remainder,
he directed his trustees, after the death of the wife, to "pay,
assign, and transfer the sum of 10001., other part of the rest and
residue of the said moneys and personal estate, to each and every
my nephews and nieces, the children of my said deceased sister
Elizabeth Buck (except Thomas Buck). But in case of the death
of any of my said nephews and nieces before my said wife, and
without leaving lawful issue, then I give and bequeath the respective sums of 10001., of them, my said nephews and nieces so
dying as aforesaid, in equal shares and proportions, unto and
amongst all and every my surviving nephews and nieces, the
children of my said deceased sister Elizabeth Buck (including the
said Thomas Buck), who shall be living at such the death of my
said wife, and to the issue of such of them as may be then dead,
in equal shares and proportions (such issue to be entitled to the
parent's share only)." The testator then directed his trustees to
"pay, assign, and transfer" the surplus and remainder of his
residuary estate, upon trusts similarly expressed, for the benefit
of all his nephews and nieces, children of his two sisters Margaret
Mence and Elizabeth Buck, and their issue "(such issue to be
entitled to its parent's share only)."
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As to the 10001. legacy to one of the nieces, Elizabeth Gilman,
the testator provided, that in case all her children should die
either in her lifetime or after her decease under age, and without
having lawful issue, his trustees should "pay, assign, and transfer"
fhe said legacy so given to his said niece Elizabeth Gilman, "unto
and equally amongst all and every my nephews and nieces, the
children of my said late deceased sister Elizabeth Buck, who shall
be living at that time, and to the issue of such of them as may be
then dead (such issue to be entitled to its parent's share only)."
The will further provided that the shares of the nieces should
be for their separate use, and should after their deaths be divided
amongst their respective children; and then as to the snares of
the surplus of the residuary estate bequeathed, as above stated,
to all the nephews and nieces, directed that, in case all the children
of the testator's other nieces, or of any or either of them, should
die either in their respective lifetimes, or after their decease,
under age, and without having lawful issue, then the trustees were
to pay, assign, and transfer such shares of the testator's said other
nieces "unto and equally amongst all and every my nephews and
nieces, the children of my said late deceased sister Elizabeth Buck,
and of my said sister Mary Mence, who shall be living at such
time or times, and to the issue of such of them as may be then
deid (such issue to be entitled to its parent's share only), except
as to the sums of 10001. so given to my other nieces as aforesaid,
which I direct shall not survive to my said niece Margaret Lanphier or her children, but be paid and payable in the same manner
as I have directed the 10001. given to my niece Elizabeth (Gilman),
in case of her decease without issue, or their all dying under age
and without issue."
The testator died in 1814, and his widow, the tenant for life, in
1840. The one sister, Elizabeth Buck, had six children-James
and Thomas, who died without having been married, the one in
1810 (in the testator's lifetime), the other in 1855; Mary, who
died a spinster in 1864, and in respect of whose interest under
the will the present petition was preferred; the defendant, Ann,
also a spinster; John, who died in 1860, leaving issue Elizabeth
Ann, a spinster, now living, and a respondent to the petition, and
five grandchildren, infants (children of John Henry Buck, who
died in 1859), also respondents; and, sixthly, Elizabeth Margaret,
who married a Mr. Gilman, and died in 1884, leaving issue
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Edward, the present petitioner, and Margaret, who married a Mir.
Royle, and died in 1845 without issue. The other sister, Mary
Alence, died in 1816, leaving issue Margaret Lucy, who married
a Mr. Lanphier, and died in 1852, leaving issue William Henry
and Thomas Halifax, now living, and Margaret, who married a
Air. Press, and died in 1842, leaving three children. Both Mrs,
Royle and Mrs. Press had settled their interests under the
testator's will.
The questions now arising wereFirst, whether Mary Buck, having died without having had
issue, the gift over took effect?
Secondly, whether the term "issue" must be confined to
children, or extended to remoter descendants ?
Thirdly, whether the gift over was original or substitutionary?
Fourthly, in either case must the persons entitled to take
survive the tenant for life ? and also,
Fifthly, must they survive their own parents ?
Sixthly, was this a gift to the issue as joint tenants, or as
tenants in common ?
Erskine, for the petitioner Edward Gilman, contended that the
only parties entitled to share were the children of a sister living
at the death of the tenant for life and children then living of
deceased children, per stirpes; thus excluding grandchildren of
a sister who died in the lifetime of the tenant for life, and all
great-grandchildren of a sister
Chiapman Barber, for the trustees of Mrs. Royle's settlement,

followed in a similar sense, except that he contended for the
admission of grandchildren of sisters who did not survive the
tenant for life.
alasse, Q. 0., for the executor of the will of Mary Buck,
argued that the gift over not taking effect according to the terms
of the will, the original gift to Mary Buck remained in force.

Boyjle, for Ann Buck.
-Lindley,for the sons of Maigaret Lanphier.
Bailyj, Q. C., for one of the children of Mrs. Press; and
Toller, Q. C., for her two remaining children, argued that
great-grandchildren were entitled to a share in the fund.
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Longley, for the five infant children of John Henry Buck, in
the same interest.
.Erskine, in reply.
The following authorities were cited on the several points:First, 2 Jarm. Wills 667, 2d ed.; Jones v. Westcombe, 1 Eq.
Ca. Ab. 245; Meadows v. Parry,1 V. & B. 124; Osborn v.
Bellman, 2 Giff. 593; Mackinnon v. Sewell, 2 My. & K. 202;
Lassence v. Tierney, 1 Mac. & G. 561 ; and Warren v. Rudall
4 Kay & J. 603; s. c., 9 H. L. 0. 428.
Secondly, 2 Jarm. Wills 177, 3d ed.; Sibley v. Perry,7 Yes.
522; Lyon v. Coward, 15 Sim. 290; Loring v. Thomas, 1 Drew.
& Sm. 497 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1115; Bradshaw v. -Yelling,19 Beav.
417 ; Ross v. Boss, 20 Id. 645; Stevenson v. Abington, 31 Id.
305; 9 Jur. N. S. 1065; Be Corrie's Will, 32. Beav. 426;
Barker v. Barker, 5 De G. & S. 753; Penny v. Clarke, 1 De
G., F. & J. 425; and Re Pell's Trust, 3 Id. 292.
Thirdly, Hawk. Wills 251, 253 ; Pearsonv. Stephens, 5 Bligh
N. S. 203; Macgregor v. Macgregor, 2 Coll. 192; Bennett v.
Merriman, 6 Beav. 360; and Thompson v. Clive, 23 Id. 283.
Fourthly and fifthly, iulme v. Hulme, 9 Sim. 644; Whittell
v. Dudin, 2 J. & W. 279; Humfrey v. Humfrey, 2 Drew. &
Sm. 49; Mayer v. Townsend, 3 Beav. 443; Masters v. Scales,
13 Id. 60; Watkins v. Weston, 8 Law T. N. S. 406; H~arcourt
v. Harcourt,26 L. J. Ch. 536; Re Bennett, 3 Kay & J. 280;
Be Wildman's Trusts, 1 Johns. &H. 299; Norman v. Kynaston,
3 De G., F. & J. 29; and several of the cases cited above on the
other points.
Sixthly, Harcourtv. Harcourt,ubi sup., and Penny v. Clarke,
ubi sup.
Judgment reserved.
Sir R. T. KiNDERSLEY, V. C.-The question upon this petition
relates to the share of Mary Buck, the daughter of Elizabeth
Buck, to whom a legacy of 10001., and a share in the residue of
his estate, was bequeathed by the testator, the Rev. Thomas Bond.
There is a gift over, and Mary Buck having died unmarried, of
course the gift over to her children cannot take effect, and the
question is, who takes under it ? First, however, does the gift
over take effect at all ? Has the event happened on which it was
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to take effect ? If it has, then the other questions arise. Applying the language of the will to the case of Mary Buck, the gift
over is to take effect "1if all Mary Buck's children shall die in
her lifetime, or after her decease under age, and without having
lawful issue." But Mary Buck never had children, and so,
according to the strict terms of the will, the event has not happened. But there are many cases in which it has been held, that
although the mode of dying with respect to leaving issue, has not
happened.precisely as prescribed, yet the testator's intention was,
that the gift over should take effect, in whatever manner the
failure of issue might occur. Zeadows v. Parry,supra, is the
case which bears most strongly on this point. In the present case
there is an indication of the testator's intention, for in the general
gift over he refers to the particular provision with respect to Mrs.
Gilman's share; the same language is used in the two provisions,
but in the former he speaks of a further possibility, as being Mrs.
Gilman's death without issue, and therefore it is clear that he
intended the gift over to take effect in the event of Mary Buck
never having had a child.
The further questions, therefore, arise, the first of which is, who
are meant by the term "1issue ?" Children, or issue in any degree
of remoteness ? Secondly, whatever it means, must such children
or issue survive the tenant for life (Mary Buck) in order to take ?
with 'regard to which we must consider the effect of the words
"cpay, assign, and transfer." Thirdly, supposing it not necessary
that such children or issue should survive the tenant for life, must
they be living at the death of their respective parents? Fourthly,
whether such children or issue shall take as joint tenants, or as
tenants in common? As to the first point, I think that the
direction that the " issue shall be entitled to the parent's share
only," clearly shows that " issue" means children. Many cases
have decided this, and Sibley v. -Perry, supra, is clear on the
subject.
Then comes the question, whether the children of nephews and
nieces must survive the tenant for life, or must those who died in
the lifetime of Mary Buck be excluded from the gift ? It appears
to me, that much difficulty would be removed by applying to these
questions those rules and principles which are generally applied
in the construction of wills.
A well-known canon of construction is, that where a testator has
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used certain language, the court must not interpolate any clause
or condition, unless the context renders it necessary. The court
has no right to say that it is extremely probable that if it had
occurred to the testator he would have done one thing or another.
Another rule is, that if there be a gift in trust for A. for life, and
-after his death in trust for his children equally, all A.'s children
take whether they survive him or no; so, if the gift had been
"after A.'s death in trust for the children of B.," the result
would have been the same; all B.'s children would have taken
whether they survived A. or no, and in such case whether they
survived their own parent or no. Another rule is this :-If the
gift is in trust for A. for life, and after his death for C. and D.
and the children of B., they all take; and it makes no difference
whether the words are "in trust for," or "to pay, assign, and
transfer to." It is true, that in some cases it has been said you
cannot "1pay" to a dead person; but that argument applies equally
to "holding in trust for ;" the weight of authority is in favor of
my view, and I think that the words "pay, assign, and transfer"
do not affect the question as to who are to take. Here the gift is
to two classes, the nephews and nieces, and the issue of such of
them as might be dead; and this raises the question as to-original
or substitutionary gifts. The distinction between the two appears
to me to be very plain. Is this an original gift to the issue, or is
it a gift to them by way of substitution? Clearly it is as much
original to them as it is to the nephews and nieces.. Taking the
simple case of a gift "to A. for life, and after his death without
issue, to all my other nephews and nieces; but if any one of them
die before the tenant for life, then to the issue of the one so dying ;"
this is a gift by way of substitution, because in the first instance
the testator gives expressly to the parent; not only to those
nephews and nieces who may be living at the death of the tenant
for life, but an absolute gift to all; and then if any of them die
before the tenant for life, he divests the interest, and substitutes
the issue for the one so dying. If the gift had been to all the
nephews and nieces, without saying "1who shall be living at the
death of the tenant for life," and then proceeding to add, "if any
die in the lifetime of the tenant for life, I shall give to the issue
the share I have given to the parent," the effect would have been
that, with regard to any one who did not survive the tenant for
life, but yet died without issue, the original gift would have
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remained undivested; on the other hand, if the gift be in the
present form, namely, to those living at the death of the tenant
for life, and then an independent gift to the issue of such of them
as may be then dead, if any of the first class of persons die in the
lifetime of the tenant for life, there is no gift to that person, and
therefore there would be a great difference in the effect, as regarded the nephews and nieces themselves. The distinction,
therefore, is not a trivial one. In the present case the gift is
clearly an original one to the issue ; it is a gift to such persons
as answer the description of nephews and nieces, and an original
gift to the issue of such of them as have died at the time specified; that is, the issue of persons who do not come within the
first class.
I may here observe, that in the other case (Be Turner), in
which I have reserved judgment, the gift is by substitution.
Many cases have arisen Where the gift to the parent and that
to the children is made contingent on the same event; and the
form of the gift is not to stich nephews and nieces *as shall be
living at the death of the tenant for life, and the issue of such of
them as may be then dead, but a gift " to all my nephews and
nieces if they shall be living at the death of the tenant for life;
but if they shall be then dead, to their children." Now, as in
such cases there is a contingent gift to the parent, it appears to
me that the gift to the children is by way of substitution. In the
preseht case, however, there being an original gift to the childten,
as well as to the nephews and nieces, all we have to do is to
ascertain who come within those two classes.
But it is contended that we must introduce into the will a pro.
vision, that none shall take unless they survive the tenant for life.
Why should that be introduced, when nothing of the kind is found
in the will? In a case wherd the gift is an original gift to the
issue, why are they to be put under such a condition, when if the
gift had been to A. for life, and after A.'s death, then to the
children of B., there would have been no such condition ? Even
if the gift had been by substitution, as "1to all the nephews and
nieces," without saying "surviving the tenant for life," and if any
of them should die in the lifetime of the tenant for life, that then
the issue of that one so dying should take the share which was
See post, p. 234.
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first given to the parent, why should such a condition be inserted?
It appears to me, that whether the gift is original or only substitutionary, unless the testator says that the issue must survive the
tenant for life, the court has no right to introduce any such condition. The ground assigned for this contention appears to be,
that it is not likely that the testator would have annexed the condition to the gift to the parents, and not have annexed it to the
gift to the children; but I do not think that a sufficient ground
for inserting the condition. The conclusion, therefore, at which I
had arrived is, that whether the gift be original or by substitution,
the issue need not survive the tenant for life. Another question
which has been raised is this--assuming that the children of
nephews and nieces, in order to take, need not survive the tenant
for life, must they survive their own parent? Supposing a
nephew or niece died in the lifetime of the tenant for life, and had
children, some one of whom had predeceased its parent, would
such child take ? If it be an original gift to the issue, why should
such a condition be imposed ? Where the gift is by substitution,
there is an element which prevents the application of the principle
I have stated, because then it is not an original gift to the issue,
but an absolute gift to the nephews and nieces ; and then, in case
of any of them dying in the lifetime of the tenant for life, to those
who are substituted in their place; but until the death of the
nephew or niece, no substitution takes place, or can take place;
and in such a case, of course, dead persons are not substituted ;
and therefore I think the rule is, that if the gift be an original
one to the issue, they need not survive their own parent; but that
if it be by substitution, they must survive their own parent in
order to take by substitution. It must be observed, that there
are cases where, though the gift to the issue is original, and where,
according to the general principle, it would not be necessary for
the children to have survived their parent, the testator, by his
language, has precluded children who did not survive their parent
from taking; as in a gift to such as survive the tenant for life,
and to the issue of such of them as shall die in his lifetime, leaving
issue; in such a case the issue who predeceased their own parent
would not take, being excluded by the terms of the will.
There remains one more question-whether the children who
take their parents' share take it as tenants in common, or as joint
tenants. I find nothing in the testator's language importing
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severance. In Penvy v. Clarke, 1 De G., F. & J. 425, Lord
Justice TURNER thought that, although the parents took as tenants
in common, it did not follow that the issue took as the parents, for
they might take as joint tenants. I must apply that principle
here. With regard to this question, it must be observed, that
some of the children of the nieces, viz. Nlfs. Royle and Mrs. Press,
have assigned their interests ; this operated as a severance of their
interests in their parents' shares, and therefore, the joint tenancy
would not apply to their shares. It appears to me, that the whole
effect of the will is, that with regard to the fund representing the
10001. legacy, one-third will go to Ann Buck, one-third to Elizabeth Ann Buck, the daughter of John Henry Buck ; she taking
by survivorship, having survived her three brothers. The remaining one-third will go to the petitioner Edward Gilman and
the trustees of 11rs. Royle's settlement equally. With regard to
the share of the residue, one-fourth will go to Ann Buck, onefourth to Elizabeth Ann Buck, one-fourth equally between the
petitioner Edward Gilman and Mrs. Royle's trustees, and the
remaining fourth equally between William Henry Lanphier, Thomas
Halifax Lanphier, and Mrs. Press on the other hand, her marriage
settlement having severed the joint tenancy. With regard to the
authorities, I have gone through them carefully, and I find the
result to be"as follows :-So far as relates to the question (where
the gift is an original gift to the children of nephews and nieces
dying before the tenant for life), whether the children to take must
survive the tenant for life, the opinions are divided. The late
Vice-Chancellor of England was in favor of the view I have
arrived at, and so is Lord Justice TURNER, Vice-Chancellor
STUART, and Vice-Chancellor WOOD.
I think I may say, that
the judges whose opinions are against my view are Lord Justice
KN\iOIT BRUCE and the Master of the Rolls. At the same time,
I find that each of these judges in one case decided in accordance
with the view which I think correct. I think, therefore, that it
may fairly be said, that the preponderance of opinion is in favor
of the view which I have taken of the present case. Where the
gift is by substitution, Lord Justice KxiGIIT BRUCE and the
Master of the Rolls were of opinion that the children must survive
the tenant for life. In the case of Pearsou v. Stephens, 5 Bligh
N. S. 203, the point in question was never raised by counsel, but
in the order of the House of Lords the condition is imposed of
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surviving the tenant for life; but under those circumstances I do
not consider it any authority, and I must consider that where the
gift is by substitution, the issue need not survive the tenant for
life. Lord LA-GDALE was also of opinion that they need not
survive the tenant for life, and so decided in Mlasters v. Scales,
13 Beav. 60, although in Bennett vs. Merriman, 6 Id. 360, he
had doubted it, and had come to a different conclusion ; and ViceChancellor WOOD, in Bennett's Trusts, 3 Kay & J. 280, decided
in accordance with my view. With regard to the question, whether the issue must survive their own parent, I think, as I have
already stated, the principle to be applied is, that where the gift
to the issue is original, it is not necessary ; but that when it is
substitutionary, it is necessary. Two cases came before myself
in -which the opinions are at variance ; viz. ITarcotirt v. Hfarcourt,
26 L. J. Ch. 589, in which I stated the same principles; and
Hfunifreg v. .runmfrey, 2 Drew. & S. 49, in which I consider that
I ought not to go against the authorities, and decided, reluctantly,
not to include the children who had predeceased their own parent.
But now having gone through all the authorities, .and very much
considered the point, I think that I should not be justified in
adhering to that view; and, therefore, I must hold that, where
the gift is original to the issue, they need not survive their own
parent, but that where the gift to them is by substitution, it is
necessary.'
Vice- Chancellor K1indersley's Court.
RBE TURNER.
A testator bequeathed 5001. upon trust for his daughter for life, and directed that
if she should die without issue (which event happened) the fund should be paid to
his four sons, share and share alike, but in case any or either of his sons should
be then dead, he directed that the share of him or them so being dead should be
paid to his or their child or children, share and share alike, but if there should be
no child, then to his or their legal personal representatives :
Held, that the gift to the son's children was substitutionary, and, therefore, that
such chil Iren as did not survive their parelits were excluded from the terms of the
gift, though it was not uecessary that such children should survive the tenant for
life:
Held, also, that no exception could be made in the present case to the genera]
rule, that the term "legal personal representatives" must be construed as execu
.ors and administrators."

1 See note at the end of the following case, post, p. 238.
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TnIs was a petition for payment out of court and division of a
fund, involving questions of a similar nature to those which were
raised in the previous petition (Lanpider v. Batek), and judgment
had therefore been reserved in the former case till the arguments
in the present case had been concluded. The judgments in each
petition were delivered together. The facts of the present petition
were these
Thomas Turner, by his will dated the 5th April 1805, bequeathed the sum of 5001. to trustees upon trust, to pay the
income to his daughter Margaret Moyle for her life, and after her
decease to apply the interest of the said sum of 5001. towards the
maintenance and education of such child or children as she should
leave at her decease, until he, she, or they should attain his, her,
or their age or ages of twenty-one years, and upon his, her, or
their attaining that age, to pay over and equally divide the said
sum of 5001. between and amongst them, if more than one share
and share alike, but if there should be but one child then to such
only child; and if his said daughter should die without issue, then
he willed and directed,
"That the said sum of 5001., together with the interest thereof,
if any then due, shall be paid unto and amongst my sons Thomas,
John, William, and Zachary Turner, share and share alike; but
in case any or either of my said sons shall be then dead, I will
and direct that the part or share of him or them so being dead
shall be paid to his or their child or children, share and share
alike if more than one, and if but one, then to such only child;
but if there be no child, then to his or their legal representatives,
and upon no other trust whatever."
The testator gave his residuary personal estate upon the same
trusts as he had given the 5001.
In 1806 the testator died, leaving his five children mentioned in
his will surviving him, they being also his sole next of kin.
In 1829 Thomas the son died; in April 1835 Zachary died a
bachelor; in June 1835 William died; in 1839 John died; in
1864 Margaret Moyle died, without having ever had a child.
The sons, Thomas, William, and John, had children, some ot
whom died in the testator's lifetime or early infancy ; others died
in the lifetime of their respective fathers, and some, having survived their fathers, died in the lifetime of Margaret Moyle, the
tenant for life; some survived Margaret Moyle.
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Differences having arisen as to the division of the 5001. and the
residue, the trustees paid the funds into court. The present petition was by the grandchildren of the testator who survived Margaret Moyle.
The following questions arose:First, as to the shares of the sons Thomas, William, and John,
whether the classes of children to take were all the children in
being at the death of the testator or subsequently born; or only
such of them as having survived their own parents survived the
tenant for life.
Secondly, as to Zachary's share, whether in the gift of the 5001.
the words "legal representatives" meant " executors or administrators" or "next of kin" according to the Statute of Distributions.
Thirdly, whether such next of kin, if it were so held, were to
be ascertained at the death of Zachary or at the death of the tenant for life.
Fourthly, whether Mrs. Moyle, the tenant for life, was included.
Fifthly, whether they took in equal shares per capita, or in
unequal shares per stirpes; and
Sixthly, whether they took as tenants in common or as joint
tenants.
Shapter, Q. C., for the petitioner.
B. Charles, for respondents, being grandchildren of the testator
who survived their own parents, but died in the lifetime of the
tenant for life.
C.A. Turner for other respondents, being children of testator's
sons who, being alive at the testator's death, died in their father's
lifetime.
Shapter, Q. C., in reply.
Oases cited: Pearson v. Stephen, 5 Bligh. N. S. 203;
Christopherson v. ANaylor, 1 Mer. 320; Salisbury v. Petty,
3 Hare 86, 93; Byre v. Alarsden, 2 Keen 564; Loring v.
Thomas, I Dr. & Sm. 497; Harcourt v. Harcourt, 26 L. J.
N. S. 536, Ch.; ffumfrey v. JHumfrey, 2 Dr. & Sm. 55; Bennett v. -lerriman, 6 Beav. 360; -3facgregor v. i5aegregor, 2
Coll. C. 0. 192; Holgate v. Jennings, 11 L. T. Rep. N. S. 501;
Brause v. Cooper, 1 J. & H. 210; lhfasters v. Scales, 13 Beav.
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60; Re Kirkman's Trusts, 3 De G. & J. 558; Penny v. Clarke,
1 De G. F, & J. 425 -2'Re Corrie's Till, 32 Beav. 426; Bootr.
v. Vicars, 1 Coll. 0. 0. 6; Walker v. MAfarquis Camden, 16
Sim. 3'29 ; Smith v. Palmer,7 Hare 229 ; Barker v. Barker,
5 De G. & S. 759; Re Bennett's Will, 3 K. & J. 281; Re
Wildman's Trusts, 1 J. & H. 299; Re Pell's Trusts, 3 De G.
F. & J. 291; Askling v. Knowles, 3 Drew 593; King v. Cleve.
land, 4 De G. & J. 482; Bullock v. -Downe, 9 H. L. Cas. 1;
Reed v. Snell, 2 Atk. 57; Leek v. IeDowell, 32 Beav. 28.
The 'VI E-ORANCELLoR.--We find in this case an illustration of
what I stated in the case of Lanrhier v. Buck, as to a gift by
substitutioii, there being an absolute gift in the first instance, with
a divesting clause, and on this point the observations I made in
the other case apply to this. The next question is, what is meant
by "1legal representatives." On the one hand, it is contended
that it means "1executors or administrators ;" on the other hand,
that it means 11 next of kin." If it means executors or administrators, then there is an end to all question; but if it means next
of kin, the same questions arise as in Lanphier v. Buck, and the
same observations apply to this case. The rule is, that representatives or legal representatives primarily mean executors or
administrators, and in order to put any other meaning on it, you
must find some reason for doing so in the will. But it appears to
me that, so far from finding anything in the will to the contrary,
we find that the testator intended it to be so used. Mrs. Moyle
lived till 1864, and died without leaving any children, upon which
event the gift over was to take effect, and the fund to go over to
the four sons. Zachary, one of the sons, had died a bachelor, in
the lifetime of Mrs. Moyle, and therefofe the question is, whether
under the term " representatives," Zachary's share should go to
the executors or administrators, as part of his assets, or to his
next of kin. The testator had given to Zachary an absolute interest; it is true he divests it if Zachary died in the sister's lifetime,
and then it was to go to his children; but if there were no child.
ren, the original gift should remain, and the share go to his executors and administrators; and it appears to me that such is the
intention shown on the will. In many cases "representati~-es"
has been construed " next of kin," because some such words as
" share and share alike" have been. found joined to them, and such
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words could not apply to executors; the words "unto and among"
also implying a tenancy in common, have had the same effect.
being contrary to the position of executors; and in the same way
a gift to representatives "to take per capita and not per stirpes."
In the case of Bobinson v. Smith, 6 Sim. 47, where the testator
gave a fund to the husband of his daughter as trustee for the
daughter for life, and after her death upon trust for such persons
as she should appoint; and, in default of appointment, in trust for
her legal representatives; the term was held to be next of kin,
because the husband, as trustee, was directed to pay it, whereas,
if it meant representatives under the statute, he would retain it
instead of paying it. It therefore appears to me that the share
of Zachary goes to his legal personal representatives as part of
his estate ; and as to that share the other questions do not arise.
With regard to the other shares, the gift being substitutionary,
the same questions arise as in Lanphier v. Buck, and all the
conclusions at which I arrived in that case apply here, except that
in this case, the gift to the children being substitutionary, I am of
opinion that such children as did not survive their own parent will
be excluded.
Costs out of the fund.
The accidental circumstance of two
successive petitions, raising similar questions of construction, coming on for
argument before Vice-Chancellor KINDEaSLE
on the same day, enabled his
Honor to deliver a judgment in the
principal case in which the whole question of gifts, by which children are substituted in the place of their parents, is
carefully and clearly summed up, and
one, at least, of the unsettled points in
connection with the subject is settled.
The distinction between cases of independent and substitutionary gifts to
the issue of a class of children has been
long recognised.
The former cases
occur wherever the children, and the
issue of children from two distinct
elasses, and the objects of the second
class take under a substantive gift, and
not expressly by way of substitution,
for the members of the first class, e. g.,
a gift to the children of A., and the

issue of such children of A. as shall
have died before a given period. There
the gift to the issue of the children is
said to be an independent gift. The
latter cases occur wherever there is first
a gift to a class of children, and then
a gift over of the shares of members
of this class upon their respective deaths
to their issue, e. g., a gift to the children
of A. with a gift over in case any of
such children of A. as shall have died
before a given period, or a gift to the
children of A. living at a certain period,
or the issue of such of them as shall
have previously died. There the gift
to the issue of the children is said to be
substitutionary. It is not easy to see
any real distinction in principle between,
these cases, and, probably, if all the
decisions upon the question of the vesting of legacies could be disregarded,
and what has been called "the pole-star
in the construction of devises," viz.
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the testator's intention, were to be followed, all the cases of the kind we have
mertioned, in which the obvious intention iq to put the issue in the place of
their Iarents in a certain event at a certain time, would be governed by the
same rule. But, as it happens, the distinction has been firmly established by
authority, and it becomes necessary to
accept it as the basis upon which further developments upon the same subject must proceed. In accordance with
this distinction, it has been determined
that under a (so-called) independent
gift to a class of children living at a
given period, and the issue of such of those
children as shall be then dead, the issue
of a child dying in the testator's lifetime
or dead at the date of the will, are entitled (Colthurst v. Carter, 15 Beav.
421) ; whereas, under a (so-called)
substitutionary gift to a class of children
living at a given period with a gift over
of the shares of members of the class
to thtir issue, the gift over would not
comprise the issue of a child dead at the
date of the will, although it would,
unless preceded by a life interest, comprise the issue of a child dying in the
lifetime of the testator : Cort v. Winder,
1 Coll. 320. If a previous life interest
were interposed, the substitutionary gift
would only include the issue of a child
who survived the testator: Ire v. King,
16 Beav. 56. These cases, however,
only determined what classes of issue
were entitled to take under gifts of this
character. They did not decide what
was the effect upon the shares of members of such classes of their own deaths
before the period fixed for the distribution or the property. It is also to be
observed that in these cases there was
no express direction that issue should
take only their parents' shares. Two
principal qiuestions, therefore, remained
to be considered. First. Can any member of a class of issue take who pre-

deceases the child through whom he
claims ? Secondly. Must every member of the class of issue survive the
period of distribution where this contingency is expressly attached to the gift
to the children, but is omitted in the
gift to the issue of such children ?
The Vice-Chancellor has dealt with
both these questions in the principal
cases, and has determined as to the first
that in the case of a (so-called) independent gift (Lanplher v. Buck, ante 224),
every member of a class of issue is entitled to take whether he survives the
child through whom lie claims or not,
but that in a case of a (so-called) substitutionary gift (Re Turncr, ante 234)
no issue of a child can take who does not
survive his own parent; and as to the
second question, that whether the gift
be in form independent or substitutionary, no distinction is caused by the circumstance mentioned, but that, in the
absence of express words, the court will
not imply in the gift to the issue'a contingency similar to that attached to the
interest of the parents.
We must, we suppose, accept the decision on the first point, as the necessary
consequence of the previous authorities
as to the distinction between (so-called)
independent and substitutionary gifts.
We regret that the Vice-Chancellor felt
bound to observe this distinction, and
that he did not decide, broadly, that all
cases where, as in the principal cases,
there is an express direction that the
issue shall take the parent's share, and
the intention is thereby shown to place
the issue in the place of the parent, no
issue can take any vested interest during
the parent's lifetime, but that the members
of the class of issue to take are to be
ascertained at the death of the parent.
If this course had been adopted these
gifts, 'which may be denominated "re
presentative gifts," would have been
brought under a single rule of construe-
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tion, reasonable in principle and convenient in practice. We think that there
was no absolute necessity for extending
the distinction we have pointed out between independent and subsitutionary
gifts to representative gifts, and there
-was a strong argument in favor of disregarding it, derived from the circumstance that in both cases the intention
of the testator to place! the living issue
in the place of their dead parents, was
clearly shown by the words used that
they should take only their parent's
share.
We cordially concur in the view of the
Vice-Chancellor on the second point,
that the circumstance that the parents
are required to survive the tenant for
life in order to take any share, does not
imply that none of the issue of the
parents can take unless they themselves
survive the same period.
As there has been much conflict of judicial opinion upon this point, it may be
well to give, in brief chronological
order, the results of the various reported
cases. In Pearson v. Stephen, 5 Bl.
203 (1831), it was assumed, without
argument (the time not having arrived
for deciding the point), that in a socalled independent gift, viz., to A. for
life, remainder to the five sons of the
testator living at the death of A., and
their respective issue, no issue of a deceased son could take who did not survive the tenant for life. In Bennet v.
Merriman, 6 Beav. 360 (1843), where

the gift was substitutionary, Lord LANGDALE held the words of contingency expressed in the case of the parents, ought
to be implied in the case of the issue.
A similar conclusion was arrived at by
Lord Justice KNIGHT BRUCE (then Vice-

Chancellor), in Macgregorv. Alacgregor, 2 Coll. 193 (1845), in the case of a
gift independent in point of form. In
both these cases there were directions
that the issue should only take their
parents' share. On the other hand, in

Lyon v. Coward, 15 Sim. 287 (1846),
Vice-Chancellor SHAD'WELL held that
where the gift to the issue was independent in point of form, the contingency
ought not to be implied. It is to be observed that Macgregor v, Macgregor was
not cited in this case. In M3fasters v.
Scales, 13 Bear. 60 (1850), Lord LANGDALE refused to import the contingency
into a substitutionary gift. Vice-Chancellor PARKER followed Lyon v. Coward
in Barker v. Barker, 5 De G. & Sm.
753 (1852), as also did Vice-Chancellor
KINDERSLEY in Hfarcourt v. Harcourt,
5 W. R. 478 (1857), and Vice-Chancellor WooD in Re Bennett's Trust, 3 K.
& J. 281 (1857y, aTY cases of gifts to
issue, independent in point of form,
coupled with directions that the issue
should take their parents' shares only.
In Penny v. Clarke, Johns. 621 (1859),
Vice-Chancellor WooD decided in the
same way in a precisely similar case of
independent gift, and his decision was
confirmed on appeal to the Lord Justices
(8W . R. 286; 1 De G. F. & J. 425),
in consequence of Lord Justice TURNER
concurring in the view of the judge in
the court below. Lord Justice KNIGHT
BRUCE differed, considering that his
opinion, as expressed in Macgregor v.
Macgregor, ought also to be applied in
the case of gifts in a so-called independent form. In Crause v. Cooper, 1
J. & H. 210 (1859), Vice-Chancellor
WOOD hinted (the point did not call for
a decision) that a different rule should be
applied in the case of a purely substitutionary gift, and that there the contingency which was expressed in the gift
to the parents should be implied in the
gift to the issue. In .3 Wildman's
Trust, 1 J. & H. 299 (1860), ViceChancellor WOOD considered the bequest to be an independent gift to the
issue, and refused to import words of
contingency. A similar conclusion was
arrived at in Pell's Trust, 9 W. R. 733;
3 De G. F. & J. 291 (1861), where, in
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a case of independent gift, Lord Justice
TURNER approved of the decision of
Vice-Chancellor STUART in the court
below. Lord Justice KNIGHT BRU E
still adhered to the principle of his decision in M]Iacgregor v. Macgregor. In
Hunfrey v. Humfrey, 10 W. R. 286, 2
Dr. & Sm. 49 (1862), Vice-Chancellor
KINDERSLEY considered himself bound
by previous authorities to hold that in a
case of independent gift to issue those
who pre-deceased their own parent, as
well as the tenant for life, were excluded.
Lastly, in Corrie's Will, 32 Bear. 426,
and Holgate v. Jennings, 5 N. R. 120,
the present Mraster of the Rolls, in cases
of sobstitutionary gifts, approved and
followed the decisioh of Lord Justice
KNIGHT BRUCE in .3acgregor v. Macgregor. The result of the consideration
of these authorities is that Lord Justice
KMIGHT BRUCE considers that the words
of contingency expressed in the gift to
the parents ought to be implied in the
gift to the children, whether the gift be,
in form, independent or substitutionary;
that Sir Josn ROmILLY considers that
they ought to be implied in cases of

purely substitutionary gifts; that Lord
LANGDALE was of opinion that they
ought not to be implied in cases of substitutionary gifts; that Vice-Chancellor
LEACH, Vice-Chancellor
SISAD WELL,
Vice-Chancellor PARMER, Lord Justice
TURNER,

Vice-Chancellors

KiNDEns-

LxY, STUART, and WOOD have decided
against the implication in cases of inde
pendent gifts ; but that Vice-Chancellor
WOOD doubted the propriety of extending this decision to the case of gifts by
way of substitution.
Vice-Chancellor KNDEESLEy has decided,in the principal cases, that in gifts
of the character in question, there is no
distinction between (so-called) independent and substitutionary gifts, but
that words of contingency, pointing to
the necessity of surviving the period of
distribution, which are expressed in the
bequests of the parents, are not to be
implied in the bequests to the issue.
We trust that the decision in this respect
will be acquiesced in, and that this point
may be considered as n6w settled.Solicitors' Journal.

Court of Queen's Bench
AUSTIN v. BUNYARD.
An instrument which, upon its face, requires a certain stamp is inadmissible
in evidence if it bears that stamp, although there are facts connected with it which,
if inquired into, show that it ought to have berne a different stamp.
Held, therefore, in an action against the maker of a post-dated banker's check,
which was stamped only with the ordinary penny stamp, that although it subjected
the parties to it to a penalty for not being stamped with a bill-of-exchange stamp,
was, nevertheless, receivable in evidence.

THIS was an action by the holder of a check payable to bearer,
dated the 22d July 1864, for 3501. 12s. 6d., against the maker,
in which #A defendant pleaded pleas denying the making, and
that the plaintiff was the holder. At the trial before CocKIURx,
C. J., the defendant objected to the admissibility of the check, on
VOL. XIV.-16
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the ground that it was post-dated, and should have therefore
been stamped as a bill of exchange, whereas it bore only the ordinary penny stamp, and in support of this objection he proved that
the check was in fact made and delivered to the payer a month
earlier than its date, namely, on the 22d June 1864; upon this
the learned judge directed a nonsuit, with leave to the plaintiff to
move to enter a verdict for himself.
By the 31 Geo. 3, c. 25, s. 19, it is enacted,
"1That no bill of exchange, promissory note, or other note,
draft, or order, liable to be stamped as directed by this act, shall
be pleaded or given in evidence in any court, or admitted in any
court to be good, useful, or available in law or equity, unless the
same be duly stamped," &c.
By the 55 Geo. 8, c. 184 (schedule), a stamp-duty is imposed
upon bills of exchange, drafts, or orders payable to bearer or
order, from which, however, were exempted
"All drafts or orders for the payment of any sum of money to
the bearer on demand, and drawn upon any banker or bankers
.

.

.

provided the same shall bear date on or before the day

on which the same shall be issued," &c.
Sect. 8 retains all the powers, provisions, fines, forfeitures,
pains, and penalties of the former act.
Sect. 13 imposes a penalty of 1001. upon any person who shall
make, or knowingly take, any post-dated banker's check under
color of the above-mentioned exemption.
By the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 59 (schedule), a stamp-duty of 1d. is
imposed upon all drafts or orders for payment of any sum of
money to the bearer, or to order on demand; and by sect. 1 of
the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 20, it is enacted that
" All drafts or orders for the payment of any sum of money to
the bearer on demand, which being drawn upon any banker, &c.,
within fifteen miles of the place where such drafts or orders
S.
are issued, are now exempt from stamp-duty, shall be chargeable
with the stamp-duty of one penny for every such draft or order."
These statutes continue the penalties, disabilities, &c., of the
former acts.

H. Lloyd having, on a former day, obtained a rule nisi to set
aside the nonsuit and enter a verdict for the plaintiff, #
Laxton and Will showed cause, and contended that as the
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check in this action was post-dated, it was not within the exemption contained in the schedule of the 55 Geo. 3, c. 184, but was
liable to the stamp as a bill of exchange or promissory note, and,
not being so stamped, was (under the disability created by sect.
19 of the 31 Geo. 3, c. 25) not receivable in evidence. They
cited Field v. Woods, 7 Ad. & El. 114; -Dunsfordv. aurlewis,
1 Fos. & Fin. 702; Oliver v. fortimer, 3 Id..127; Key v.
Mathias, 3 Id. 279; Whistler v. Forster, 32 L. J. 161, C. P.,
14 0. B. N. S. 248; Whitwell v. Bennett, 3 Bos. & P. 559;
Allen v. Keenes, 1 East 435 ; U2pstone v. Marchant, 2 B. & 0.
10; Williams v. Jarrett,2 B. & Ad. 32; Serle v. .Norton,9 M.
& W. 309.
H. Lloyd, in support of the rule, contended that as, upon its
face, the check appeared to be sufficiently stamped, it was admissible in evidence, the only consequence of a disabling character
being the penalty imposed by sect. 13 of the 55 Geo. 3, c. 184.
He relied upon Williams v. Jarrett,5 B. & Ad. 32, in which it
was held that the date of a bill of exchange means the time
expressed on the face of the bill, and not the time when it was
actually issued.
COCKBURN, 0. J.-I am of opinion that this rule should be
made absolute. The cases of Williams v. Jarrett and Whistler
v. Forster are quite in point in the plaintiff's favor. It is quite
unnecessary to give any opinion as to whether or not the legislature in passing the Stamp Acts intended to make such instruments
so issued void to all intents and purposes, though I cannot help
thinking that such was its intention, and I am by no means satisfied with the reasons given for the decisions in those cases, though
the cases themselves are binding upon us. Therefore this rule
-will be made absolute, and I am not sorry that it should be, as the
defence was a very dishonest one.

J.-I quite agree that we are bound by the decisions of the cases of Williams v. JTarrett and Whistler v. Forster.
It seems to me from those decisions that we are to look at the face
of the document, and see if it is properly stamped. I certainly
cannot say that if the question was now for the first time before
us we should come to the same conclusion; we are, however,
bound by authority.
CROMPTON,
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BLACKBURN, J.-I
am of the same opinion. Whatever may
have been the proper construction under the old law when bankers'
checks were exempt from the stamp-duty, now that they are all
liable to be stamped the old objection does not arise, and parties
may still be subjected to a penalty; but the present objection can
only be sustained when the stamp upon the instruments is upon its
race insufficient.
SRIEE, J.-I also am of opinion that this rule should be made
absolute. The cases of Williams v. Jarrett and Whistler v.
Forster decide that it is sufficient to render an instrument admissible in evidence if it has upon it such a stamp as it purports upon
its face to require.
Rule absolute.

Court of Queen's Bench.
O'HANLAN v. THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY.
When goods have been intrusted to a carrier to convey to a particular plac,
and by his default they are not delivered, the party entitled to them will be warranted in procuring other similar goods at the place, if there be a market for them,

and the measure of damage will be the price at which such goods can be obtained
in the market. If, however, there is no market for such goods at the place of delivery, the damages must be ascertained by taking into consideration various matters,
such as (in addition to the cost price) the expense of transit and reasonable profits.

THIs was an action brought against the defendants for breach
of contract as carriers in not delivering certain goods delivered to
them to be carried from Leeds to Neath, the declaration stating
that "the said goods remained undelivered as aforesaid for a long
and unreasonable time, and the same became and were and still
are wholly lost to the plaintiff, whereby and by means of which
said premises the plaintiff has not only lost the said goods, but
also by means of the said premises, he has been greatly injured
and damnified in not being able to carry on his trade and business'
of a draper for want of the said goods," &c. To this the defendants pleaded payment of 221. into court. The plaintiff replied
that he had sustained damages beyond that amount.
The cause was tried before BLACKBURN, J., at tihe Swansea
Assizes, when the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for 251.,
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.being 31. more than the amount paid into court. It appeared
upon the trial that the plaintiff was a tailor who travelled with his
workmen from place to place, working up articles for the retail
trade, and selling at different places the articles so worked up, and
which were sent to him to meet him at such places. In the present
instance he had ordered certain goods to be sent to him from
Leeds to Neath, in Glamorganshire, by the Great Western Rail-,
way, so as to be delivered to .him there on the 9th and 10th
November 1863. The goods had been forwarded on the 6th
November, but from some unexplained cause they never arrived,
and the plaintiff and his men were kept idle waiting the arrival of
such goods for many days, and he then purchased other goods of
the same vendor. But in consequence of the state of things he
was necessitated to sell at a loss a horse and cart which he had
with him for the purpose of his business. Grove, Q. C., having moved (pursuant to leave) for a rule to
enter a verdict for the defendants on the ground that the 221. paid
into court covered the cost price of the goods and the charge of
bringing them to Neath, and thus the plaintiff was not entitled to
any further damages,
Bowen showed cause and contended that the plaintiff was entitled to damages beyond the cost price and carriage of the articles ;
namely, for his loss of profit upon them, and to himself in consequence of the non-delivery: Bice v. Bazendale, 7 H. & N. 96,
30 L. J. 371, Ex.; Wilson v. The Lancashire and Yorkshire
Railway Co., 6 H. & N. 211; Black v. Baxendale, 1 Ex. 410.
Grove, Q. C., and Giffard, Q. C., in support of the rule, contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to any damages beyond
the cost of the articles: JHadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341.
BLACKBURN, J.-I
am of opinion that this rule should be discharged. It would seem that goods costing about 201. were sent
by the defendants' line of railway from Leeds to Neath, but that
somehow or other they were lost on the way; and the question is,
what damages is the plaintiff entitled to recover ? It has been
argued for the defendants that, according to the rule laid down in
Rice v. Baxendale, the measure of damages would be the value
of the goods at the place and time where 'and when they ought to
have been delivered, which in this case would have been Neath
on the 9th November. To this rule we agree; for where, at the
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place to which goods are to be sent, there is a market, the measure
of damages under the rule will be the price at which such goods
can b6 bought in the market. Where there is no market, we have
no such means of settling the market value, and it must be ascertained by taking into consideration various matters, including, in
addition to cost-price and expenses of transit, reasonable importer's
profits. As to what these are, it may be difficult to prove by
evidence before a jury, but they should consider what are fair and
reasonable profits, which persons in the ordinary course of busi
ness in such a case would be likely to make. The defendants
have paid into court less than ten per cent. interest on the actual
cost and expenses, and the question is, were the jury warranted in
giving more? I think they were; and in this case they have done
so; and although they have been liberal, I see no ground for disturbing their verdict.
IIELLOR, J.-I
agree with my brother BLACKBURN. It is
impossible to lay down the rule that in a place where there is no
market the market-price is to be limited to the cost-price and the
expenses of carriage; another element must be added, namely,
the importer's profits. No man brings goods to a place to dispose
of without adding something to their price beyond what they cost
him to bring them, and that addition is the importer's profit. I
think the verdict ought to stand.

SHEE, J.-I
am entirely of the same opinion. I take it that
when a carrier fails to deliver goods with which he has been
intrusted, at the right time, the person to whom the duty of car
riage is owing is entitled within a reasonable time to go and purchase similar goods at the place where the carrier undertook to
deliver them. If there is a market there he suffers no damage
beyond the cost of supplying himself in the market, and the market-price will in such case afford a measure of damages. But if
there is no market where such goods can be obtained, then according to the proper construction of Hfadley v. Baxendale, the damages should be ascertained by arriving at the probable cost of
such goods obtainable there, including the reasonable profit of
importation; that is, such a sum as a dealer selling them would
require as his fair profits on the transaction.
Rule discharged.

